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17  
18 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
19 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
20 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**

21 *In Re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation*

Case No. 15-MD-02617-LHK

22 **PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN**  
23 **SUPPORT OF FINAL APPROVAL OF**  
24 **CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

25 Date: February 1, 2018  
Time: 1:30 p.m.  
Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh  
26 Crtrm: 8, 4th Floor

27 **REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 When Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval, they addressed each of the “*Churchill*  
3 factors” that would apply at the final approval stage. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for  
4 preliminary approval, but not before an hour-long hearing where the Court conducted a wide-  
5 ranging inquiry into the merits of the Settlement, actively engaged with Class Counsel and counsel  
6 for the Defendants, and considered concerns raised by counsel for certain named plaintiffs. *See*  
7 8/17/16 Hr’g Tr. [ECF 897]; 8/25/17 Order [ECF 903]. In response to the Court’s suggestions, the  
8 parties amended the proposed Settlement Agreement, clarifying the scope of the release, and  
9 revised the class notices and related communications. *See* ECF 900.

10 The settlement now comes before the Court again, this time for final approval. If  
11 approved, it would require Anthem to establish a record \$115 million settlement fund – far more  
12 than any other data breach defendant has paid to date. That fund will be used to purchase credit  
13 monitoring services to protect class members from fraud and ensure that any identity theft is  
14 detected and remedied quickly; to provide alternative compensation of up to \$50 per class  
15 member; and to pay out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the data breach. The retail  
16 value of the credit monitoring (purchased in bulk at a discount) is billions of dollars for the entire  
17 class, or, conservatively, over \$213 million to the 891,431 class members who have claimed credit  
18 monitoring thus far. Anthem will also be required to spend at least [REDACTED] to help protect  
19 class members’ personal information over the next three years – an increase of [REDACTED] over  
20 pre-breach spending – and to implement or maintain specific changes to its data security practices,  
21 including encryption of personally identifiable information (“PII”) and archiving of older data with  
22 strict access controls.

23 The Settlement Administrator has mailed class notice to 54.9 million class members; e-  
24 mailed notice to 5.15 million class members; published notice in two leading consumer magazines;  
25 and disseminated over 180 million internet advertisements on sites like Twitter, Facebook, and  
26 Google, to further apprise class members of their rights under the settlement. Class members and  
27 the public at large have responded with a great deal of interest. The national media has reported on  
28 the settlement, over 850,000 people have visited the Settlement Website, and more than 80,000

1 have called the Settlement Administrator's automated phone line for more information. Over a  
2 million class members have already submitted claims to participate in the settlement, while only  
3 eight have objected to or commented on the settlement, and only 169 have requested to opt out of  
4 the settlement. Class members have until December 29 to submit objections and opt-out requests,  
5 and until January 29 to submit claims, so it is too soon to fully assess the class's reaction to the  
6 settlement. But early indications are that the settlement has widespread support, and the other  
7 *Churchill* factors continue to favor settlement approval.

8 By settling now, class members can obtain timely and practical remedies that otherwise  
9 would not be available for years, if at all. What typical class members want most is for their  
10 private information to remain confidential and secure. Extended credit monitoring services and  
11 immediate changes to Anthem's data-security practices can help achieve that goal. Credit  
12 monitoring works to prevent and detect misuse of information taken in the data breach, while  
13 changes in data-security practices work to reduce the risk of future breaches. Credit monitoring  
14 services are needed most in the first four to five years after a data breach occurs, and security  
15 measures are most effective the sooner they can be implemented. This is a case, in other words,  
16 where delay would have hurt class members. Plaintiffs accordingly move for final approval of the  
17 Settlement on the same grounds that they sought and obtained preliminary approval – grounds that  
18 are reiterated below for the Court's and class members' convenience.

## 19 **II. BACKGROUND**

### 20 **A. Plaintiffs' Claims**

21 In early 2015, Anthem acknowledged that it had been the target of a cyberattack and that  
22 information related to approximately 78.8 million people had been compromised. Names, dates of  
23 birth, Social Security numbers, and health care ID numbers were among the stolen data. Anthem  
24 offered those affected by the data breach two years of credit monitoring, but denied that the stolen  
25 information had ever been misused.

26 Over 100 lawsuits were filed and centralized before this Court for pre-trial proceedings,  
27 and several hundred claims arising out of the laws of all 50 states were researched and  
28 consolidated into a single complaint. Fourth Consol. Am. Compl. [ECF 714-4]. Plaintiffs' claims

1 follow diverse legal paths to recovery, but all of them begin with the same premise: that Anthem’s  
2 data security was inadequate. Plaintiffs’ case depended, above all, on proving their allegations that  
3 the data breach was possible only because Anthem had aggregated almost 80 million people’s  
4 private information into a central data warehouse that was not properly secured. On behalf of  
5 those individuals, Plaintiffs sought both equitable and monetary relief.

6 **1. Equitable Remedies**

7 Plaintiffs requested several types of equitable relief. The first was aimed at reforming  
8 Anthem’s data security. Mot. for Class Cert. (“Class Cert.”) [ECF 743-12] at 10-11. Plaintiffs  
9 submitted expert analysis setting forth several security controls needed to protect the private  
10 information already stored by Anthem into the future. Strebe Report [ECF 744-17] at 73-82. Had  
11 the case not settled, Plaintiffs planned to request that the Court enter an injunction requiring  
12 Anthem to implement those additional measures and also to maintain the security reforms that  
13 Anthem had already begun during the litigation. *See* Cervantez Decl. ¶ 5.

14 The second form of equitable relief Plaintiffs sought was extended credit monitoring.  
15 Shortly after acknowledging the data breach, Anthem offered class members two years of AllClear  
16 single-bureau credit monitoring and identity repair services. *See* Opp. to Mot. for Class Cert  
17 (“Class Cert Opp.”) [ECF 797-8] at 3. That credit monitoring has expired for the class, however,  
18 and because Plaintiffs’ expert has explained that it is important to protect against identity theft or  
19 other forms of fraud with credit monitoring for the first five years following a data breach,  
20 Plaintiffs sought additional credit monitoring. Class Cert. at 10; Van Dyke Report [ECF 744-25] ¶  
21 46. Plaintiffs also requested, on the advice of their expert, credit monitoring more extensive than  
22 the AllClear services offered by Anthem, including triple-bureau credit monitoring and identity  
23 validation monitoring. Van Dyke Report ¶ 50(b); *see also* Cervantez Decl. ¶ 5.

24 Because not all class members were Anthem insureds, presenting privity and other  
25 potential defenses to certain claims, Plaintiffs also named The Blue Cross and Blue Shield  
26 Association (“BCBSA”) and 17 non-Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield companies as co-defendants  
27 with Anthem, to ensure that these class members would be entitled to monetary remedies for  
28 breach of contract and state consumer protection act statutes. Plaintiffs also sought to ensure that

1 these other BCBSA licensees employ adequate security measures before conveying their insured's  
2 private information to other licensees such as Anthem. Following the public announcement of the  
3 Anthem data breach, the BCBSA Membership Standards were amended to further define certain  
4 guidelines for the protection and cybersecurity of personal information. *See* Cervantez Decl. ¶ 7.  
5 For settlement purposes, Plaintiffs determined that this change sufficiently addressed their  
6 concerns. *Id.*

## 7 **2. Monetary Remedies**

8 Plaintiffs requested monetary relief in the Complaint under three theories of damages:  
9 Benefit of the Bargain, Loss of Value of Personally Identifiable Information, and Consequential  
10 Out-of-Pocket Expenses. *See* 2nd MTD Order [ECF 524] at 22-29. The Benefit of the Bargain  
11 theory of damages would compensate class members based on the difference in value between the  
12 health insurance Anthem should have provided (which would have included adequate data  
13 security) and the value of the health insurance that Anthem actually provided (which Plaintiffs  
14 allege lacked adequate data security). *Class Cert.* at 12. Plaintiffs have proposed isolating the  
15 value of adequate data security through a conjoint analysis, which would use surveys and statistical  
16 analyses to estimate how consumers value different product attributes. *Id.*; Rossi Report [ECF  
17 744-22] ¶ 14. Plaintiffs' expert was prepared to complete the conjoint surveys after one or more  
18 classes were certified by the Court. *See* Cervantez Decl. ¶ 6.

19 The Loss of Value of PII theory approaches damages from a different direction, and  
20 attempts to measure the economic cost of losing the confidentiality of one's private information.  
21 One way of doing this is to look at the price for certain types of PII on the black market.  
22 Plaintiffs' expert put that price at a minimum of \$10 per individual, while Defendants' expert  
23 placed it at \$4 per individual. *Class Cert.* at 13. Another way to measure Loss of Value of PII is to  
24 look at the retail price of products that protect data-breach victims from identity fraud. Plaintiffs'  
25 expert put that cost at \$9 to \$20 per month for five years. *Class Cert.* at 13; Van Dyke Report ¶ 53.

26 Plaintiffs' third measure of damages – the Consequential Out of Pocket Expenses theory –  
27 would allow class members to recover any out-of-pocket expenses they incurred as a result of the  
28 data breach. These costs include unreimbursed fraud losses, money and time spent to rectify



1 identity fraud, and fees for fraud-prevention and detection services. Class Cert. at 22. Unlike the  
2 other measure of damages, however, the evidence needed to prove out-of-pocket damages is in  
3 class members' possession and would need to be set forth on an individualized basis. *Id.* at 22-23.

4 In addition to Plaintiffs' three theories for assessing class members' actual damages, some  
5 of Plaintiffs' claims authorized statutory damages. For example, the New York GBL § 349 claim  
6 at issue in Plaintiffs' pending motion for class certification provides for an award of \$50 per  
7 violation or actual damages, whichever is greater. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h).

8 **B. History of the Litigation and Settlement Negotiations**

9 After Plaintiffs' lawsuits were centralized and their claims consolidated into a single  
10 complaint, the Court implemented a bellwether process to adjudicate those claims. ECF 326 at 2-  
11 3. Five claims chosen by Plaintiffs and five chosen by Defendants were subjected to two rounds of  
12 briefing on the pleadings. Four of the ten claims were dismissed (Indiana negligence, Kentucky  
13 consumer protection, Kentucky data breach, and Georgia insurance privacy), while the remaining  
14 six claims largely survived (California, New Jersey, and federal breach of contract, California and  
15 New York consumer protection, and New York unjust enrichment). *See* Order on 1st MTD [ECF  
16 468]; Order on 2nd MTD [ECF 524].

17 The parties have now fully briefed class certification and related *Daubert* motions.  
18 Plaintiffs have also reviewed 3.8 million pages of documents; litigated 14 discovery motions;  
19 deposed 18 percipient fact witnesses, 62 corporate designees, and six expert witnesses; produced  
20 over 100 plaintiffs and four expert witnesses for deposition (with 29 of the plaintiffs also  
21 producing their computers for forensic imaging); and exchanged 76 interrogatories, 731 RFAs, and  
22 18 expert reports with Defendants. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs' extensive discovery provided  
23 them with a deep understanding of Anthem's highly-complex IT systems, the numerous technical  
24 and administrative controls involved in Anthem's data security system, and the deficiencies within  
25 that system that Plaintiffs allege contributed to the data breach and should be remedied. *Id.* ¶ 19.

26 While the parties were briefing class certification, they were also engaging in a series of  
27 mediation sessions with Judge Layn R. Phillips (Ret.). *Id.* ¶ 4. After three full-day mediations  
28 over the course of three months – on February 28, April 20, and May 22, 2017 – the parties still

1 had not reached a deal. *Id.* Judge Phillips ultimately made a mediator’s proposal, which both  
2 sides accepted over Memorial Day weekend. *Id.*

3 **C. Overview of the Settlement**

4 **1. The Proposed Settlement Class**

5 If approved, the parties’ settlement would offer relief to the following proposed class:

6 Individuals whose Personal Information was maintained on Anthem’s Enterprise Data  
7 Warehouse and are included in Anthem’s Member Impact Database and/or received a  
8 notice relating to the Data Breach; provided, however, that the following are excluded from  
9 the Settlement Class: (i) Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling  
10 interest, and Defendants’ officers, directors, legal representatives, successors, subsidiaries,  
and assigns; (ii) any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the  
members of their immediate families and judicial staff; and (iii) any individual who timely  
and validly opts-out from the Settlement Class.

11 Cervantez Decl., Ex. 11 (“SA”) ¶ 1.36. This proposed class covers the approximately 78.8 million  
12 individuals whose personal information was compromised by the Anthem data breach, and  
13 parallels the class definitions suggested in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint and motion for  
14 class certification, although it does so through a single nationwide class rather than a series of  
15 state-wide classes.

16 **2. Changes to Anthem’s Data Security Practices**

17 One of the primary benefits of the proposed settlement is that it requires Anthem to  
18 improve its data security. In the years before the breach, Anthem was devoting approximately [REDACTED]  
19 [REDACTED] per year to information security. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 12. It will now be required to spend at  
20 least [REDACTED] per year over the next three years – an increase of [REDACTED] over Anthem’s  
21 pre-breach allocation. Settlement Ex. 2 [ECF 869-11] ¶ 8. Anthem will also be required to deploy  
22 specific cybersecurity measures, including encrypting PII and archiving certain databases with  
23 strict access controls. In particular, Anthem must:

- 24 (1) immediately implement [REDACTED]  
25 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED],  
including [REDACTED];
- 26 (2) remove PII in the database that was the subject of the breach no more than [REDACTED] years  
27 after it enters the database;
- 28 (3) [REDACTED];

- 1 (4) implement additional levels of management approval [REDACTED];
- 2 (5) require use of [REDACTED];
- 3 (6) [REDACTED];
- 4 (7) undertake an annual security risk assessment using an outside third party;
- 5 (8) conduct [REDACTED] at least twice per year; and
- 6 (9) conduct ongoing [REDACTED] within a
- 7 set time period.

8 *Id.* ¶¶ 1-3, 7 10-11. These measures were derived in consultation with security experts based on  
9 Plaintiffs' extensive discovery, and squarely address the inadequate security that Plaintiffs had  
10 focused on in the litigation. *See* Class Cert. at 3-4; Cervantez Decl. ¶ 19.

11 To ensure that Anthem maintains these enhanced security measures, and that the measures  
12 are operating effectively, Anthem will be required both to retain independent consultants to  
13 undertake an annual IT security risk assessment and an annual settlement compliance review, and  
14 to provide the results of the annual settlement compliance review and its annual SOC 2 Type 2  
15 assessment to Plaintiffs' counsel for review. SA ¶¶ 2.3-2.4; Settlement Ex. 2 [ECF 869-11] ¶ 7.  
16 And whereas Plaintiffs contend Anthem previously failed to spend the money required to address  
17 potential vulnerabilities identified internally or by outside auditors, Anthem will now be required  
18 to follow specific remediation schedules to address potential vulnerabilities. Settlement Ex. 2  
19 [ECF 869-11] ¶¶ 9 & 11. The proposed settlement thus ensures that Anthem will adapt to  
20 changing cybersecurity threats as they emerge.

21 These immediate fortifications to Anthem's systems represent significant improvements in  
22 Anthem's security practices, and move substantially towards remedying the many security issues  
23 Plaintiffs identified as deficient. Although Anthem's specific obligations under this part of the  
24 settlement necessarily expire after three years because the pace of technology and evolving  
25 security standards make it difficult to prescribe appropriate measures on a longer-term basis, the  
26 settlement is formulated to ensure that Anthem not only deploys the up-front resources needed to  
27 address existing security vulnerabilities, but institutionalizes the consistent costs, practices, and  
28 accountability needed for long-term, proactive data security. In addition, the cost and public

1 nature of this litigation serve as long-term incentives for Anthem to continue deploying appropriate  
2 data security.

3 **3. Settlement Fund**

4 In addition to addressing the security deficiencies that Plaintiffs believe contributed to the  
5 data breach, and ensuring that Anthem takes proactive measures to prevent against future attacks,  
6 the proposed settlement requires Anthem to pay \$115 million into a Qualified Settlement Fund.

7 SA ¶ 3.1. The Settlement Fund will be used in the following manner:

8 **a) Fraud Protection and Credit Monitoring**

9 Settlement funds will first be used to pay for at least two years of identity fraud prevention  
10 and detection services for class members who file claims. Experian has worked with Plaintiffs'  
11 counsel to create a custom product designed specifically to provide protection against the  
12 particular threats facing class members, based on the type of PII exfiltrated in the Anthem data  
13 breach. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 8. The product is based on the recommendations submitted by  
14 Plaintiffs' expert in support of class certification (*see* Van Dyke Report ¶ 52), and includes:

- 15 (a) daily monitoring of class members' credit files at all three major credit reporting  
16 agencies to detect suspicious activity (such as applications for loans or credit not  
17 initiated by the class member);
- 18 (b) internet surveillance, including monitoring the "dark web" to detect the covert sale of  
19 class members' PII;
- 20 (c) identity validation monitoring to notify class members if their identity is used to open  
21 a new account or to perform an identity validation within the Experian network;
- 22 (d) identity theft insurance, which covers designated identity theft related expenses,  
23 including unreimbursed fraud losses and professional services, up to \$1 million;
- 24 (e) Experian credit reports available upon request; and
- (f) specific services for class members who are minors, including social security number  
tracing and internet surveillance.

25 SA ¶ 4.1; Cervantez Decl. ¶ 8.

26 By purchasing credit monitoring services in bulk at a discount, the Settlement is able to  
27 provide very valuable services to class members. Although the custom product offered to class  
28 members is not available to the public, it includes many of the services offered in Experian's retail

1 “IdentityWorks Premium” product which is sold to the public for \$19.99 per month, and more  
2 services than Experian’s “IdentityWorks Plus” plan, which retails for \$9.99 per month. Cervantez  
3 Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 13. Assuming conservatively that the value of the Anthem-specific custom product is  
4 only \$9.99 per month, the credit monitoring portion of the settlement provides a total value to each  
5 class member of \$239.76 over the course of 24 months (or up to \$479.52 should there be sufficient  
6 settlement funds remaining to pay for an additional 24 months of credit monitoring). In other  
7 words, the total value of the credit monitoring package offered to the class is worth billions ( $\$9.99 \times$   
8  $24 \times 79,150,000$ ). Even using only the number of claims for credit monitoring that have been filed  
9 to date (891,431) – a conservative approach, given that the claims deadline is not until January 29,  
10 2018 – the credit monitoring portion of the settlement has provided a value of at least \$213 million  
11 to the class.

12 **b) Alternative Compensation**

13 Class members who already have credit monitoring services can instead select alternative  
14 cash compensation. SA ¶ 5.1. To request this alternative compensation, class members need only  
15 submit a simple online claim form confirming the timing and type of their current credit  
16 monitoring services. *Id.* ¶ 5.2. After all other claims, fees, and expenses are paid, the Net  
17 Settlement Fund will be used to distribute up to \$36 to these class members (to be reduced *pro rata*  
18 if necessary). *Id.* ¶ 5.3. In addition, if the total amount of these claims is less than \$13 million, the  
19 amount distributed will be increased on a *pro rata* basis, until it reaches either \$50 per person or  
20 \$13 million in the aggregate. *Id.*

21 **c) Out-of-Pocket Costs**

22 The Settlement Administrator will reserve \$15 million from the Settlement Fund to  
23 compensate class members who incurred out-of-pocket costs or spent time as a result of the data  
24 breach. SA ¶ 6.4. Reimbursable expenses may include unreimbursed fraud losses; time spent  
25 remedying issues related to the breach, at \$15 per hour or the value of the class members’ actual  
26 lost wages, whichever is greater; professional fees incurred in connection with identity theft or  
27 falsified tax returns; the cost of credit freezes, or of credit monitoring ordered between February  
28

1 2015 and the date credit monitoring becomes available under the Settlement; and miscellaneous  
2 expenses, such as notary, fax, postage, copying, mileage and long-distance charges. *Id.* ¶ 1.23.

3 Class members can submit claims for up to \$10,000 by completing a simple claim form,  
4 accompanied by an attestation regarding the expenditures incurred and simple documentation (i.e.  
5 letter from IRS if claiming IRS tax fraud expenses). *Id.* ¶ 6.4; Geraci Decl., Ex. I. So long as the  
6 claimed fraud is fairly traceable to the Anthem Data Breach (meaning it involved possible misuse  
7 of the type of personal information accessed in the Data Breach), Settlement Class Members will  
8 not have to prove “causation” – i.e., that the claimed fraud stemmed from the Anthem data breach  
9 as opposed to from some other breach. SA ¶¶ 1.23, 6.3. This is a significant benefit to class  
10 members, as proving “causation” could be insurmountable in many cases.

11 The Settlement Administrator will review all submitted claims and will have authority to  
12 determine whether and to what extent a claim for out-of-pocket costs is valid. SA ¶ 6.2. If the  
13 amount of valid claims submitted on or before the Settlement’s Effective Date exceeds \$15  
14 million, those claims will be subject to a pro rata reduction. *Id.* ¶ 6.4. Otherwise, the Settlement  
15 Administrator will continue to accept and process claims for one year after the Court’s final  
16 approval order is entered, or until the \$15 million reserve is exhausted, whichever comes first. *Id.*  
17 ¶¶ 6.1, 6.4. In the event the \$15 million reserve is exhausted, the Settlement Website will be  
18 updated to inform class members that claims for out-of-pocket expenses will no longer be  
19 processed or paid. *Id.* ¶ 6.4.

20 **d) Class Notice and Settlement Administration**

21 Due to the large size of the class and the importance of encouraging class members to sign  
22 up for credit monitoring services, the costs of notice and settlement administration have been  
23 substantial and are expected to reach approximately \$23 million. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 13. In  
24 addition to mailing postcard notice to 54.9 million class members with a known mailing address,  
25 emailing notice to 5.15 million class members with a known email address, and publishing notice  
26 in *People* and *Good Housekeeping*, the proposed settlement provides for an expansive, targeted  
27 social media advertisement campaign that included the purchase of 180 million advertising  
28 “impressions” spread across Twitter, LinkedIn, Google Display Network, and Facebook. Geraci

1 Decl. ¶¶ 10-16, Exs. C-F. The advertisements link to the settlement website, where people can  
2 enter their name and date of birth to determine whether they are a class member, and then file a  
3 claim for credit monitoring services or other settlement benefits. *Id.* ¶¶ 15, 17, Ex. F. This social  
4 media campaign is specifically designed to reach the over 23 million people for whom Anthem did  
5 not have contact information and who may not have learned that they were victims of the breach  
6 and are class members in this litigation. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 13.

7 The claims process is designed to be easy and accessible. Class members can claim credit  
8 monitoring simply by signing and returning the tear-off portion of their postcard notice. Geraci  
9 Decl., Ex. C. They may also file claims online at [www.DataBreach-Settlement.com](http://www.DataBreach-Settlement.com), which has  
10 been optimized for mobile devices and includes helpful instructional videos. *Id.* ¶ 18. Claims for  
11 credit monitoring or alternative compensation can be filed until January 29, 2018, and claims for  
12 out-of-pocket compensation can be filed up to a year after final approval (provided the \$15 million  
13 reserve is not first exhausted). SA ¶¶ 4.3, 6.1. In addition, if Class Members experience identity  
14 theft or fraud at any time while Credit Services are being offered, they will be eligible for fraud-  
15 resolution services from a trained Experian fraud resolution specialist – even if they did not file a  
16 claim for credit monitoring. *Id.* ¶ 4.9.

17 e) **Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards**

18 Plaintiffs are separately petitioning the Court for awards of attorneys' fees, costs, and  
19 service payments to be paid out of the Settlement Fund. The maximum amounts that Plaintiffs  
20 may seek were negotiated with Defendants as part of the Settlement, and as a result, Defendants  
21 have agreed not to oppose Plaintiffs' application. SA ¶¶ 11.1, 12.1.

22 f) **Residual Distribution**

23 In no event will any of the Settlement Fund revert to Defendants. Instead, it will be used to  
24 extend the duration of the credit monitoring provided to class members for up to two additional  
25 years. SA ¶ 4.8. If the residual funds are insufficient to pay for at least one additional month of  
26 credit monitoring, or if there are funds remaining after credit monitoring is extended to a total of  
27 four years, the remainder will be distributed *cy pres* to the Center for Education and Research in  
28 Information Assurance Security (CERIAS) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. SA ¶ 7.1.

1 CERIAS is a national center for research and education in areas of information security, while the  
2 Electronic Frontier Foundation is a nonprofit organization that champions user privacy. *See*  
3 <https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/about>; <https://www.eff.org/about>. These two entities are  
4 appropriate recipients of *cy pres* awards because their missions are related to the class's interests  
5 and they take into account the nationwide geographic scope of the class.

6 **4. Release**

7 In exchange for the benefits provided under the Settlement, Settlement Class  
8 Representatives and Settlement Class Members will release any legal claims that may arise from or  
9 relate to the facts alleged in the complaints filed in this litigation.<sup>1</sup> *See* SA ¶¶ 1.32 & 13.1-13.3.  
10 Pursuant to the Court's suggestions at the preliminary approval hearing, the release has been  
11 clarified to explain that Settlement Class Members are *not* releasing claims with respect to either  
12 the original cyber attackers who stole Class Members' personal information from Anthem, or from  
13 any other person or entity who intentionally misuses that stolen PII for unlawful purposes. 8/24/17  
14 Suppl. Brief [ECF 900]; Cervantez Decl., Ex. 12.

15 **III. ARGUMENT**

16 **A. The Settlement Class Satisfies Rule 23**

17 In its preliminary approval order, the Court found that the Settlement Class met the  
18 requirements of Rule 23 and preliminarily certified it under Rule 23(b)(3). 8/25/17 Order [ECF  
19 903] ¶¶ 5-7. Plaintiffs now request that the Court affirm its preliminary findings and render a final  
20 decision as to the appropriateness of class certification.

21 **1. The Class Meets The Requirements of Rule 23(a)**

22 The prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a) are numerosity, commonality,  
23 typicality, and adequacy – each of which is satisfied here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

24 The proposed settlement class, set forth above in Section II.C.1, includes approximately  
25 79.15 million people, and so readily satisfies the numerosity requirement. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P.  
26 23(a)(1). The proposed class also satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), which

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> In MDL proceedings, it is proper to release claims based on facts alleged in the underlying  
MDL complaints. *See, e.g., In re: Volkswagen "Clean Diesel,"* Case No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB,  
ECF 3230 at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2017).



1 requires that class members' claims "depend upon a common contention," of such a nature that  
2 "determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each  
3 [claim] in one stroke." *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The central  
4 question behind every claim in this litigation is whether Anthem adequately secured its data  
5 warehouse where class members' personal information was stored. *See* Class Cert at 6-7; Class  
6 Cert Reply [ECF 832-6] at 2-5. The answer to that question depends on common evidence that  
7 does not vary from class member to class member, and so can be fairly resolved – whether through  
8 litigation or settlement – for all class members at once. *See id.*

9       The final requirements of Rule 23(a) – typicality and adequacy – are likewise satisfied.  
10 The proposed class representatives each had personal information that was stored on Anthem's  
11 data warehouse and was exfiltrated during the data breach, and so were affected by the same  
12 inadequate data security that Plaintiffs allege harmed the rest of the class. *See* Class Cert. at 7-9;  
13 *Just Film, Inc. v. Buono*, 847 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) ("it is sufficient for typicality if the  
14 plaintiff endured a course of conduct directed against the class"). The proposed class  
15 representatives also have no conflicts with the class; have participated actively in the case,  
16 including by sitting for depositions and – for many of them – allowing their personal computers to  
17 be examined; and are represented by experienced attorneys who were previously appointed by the  
18 Court to represent class members' interests. *See* Class Cert. at 7-9; *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d  
19 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (adequacy satisfied if plaintiffs and their counsel lack conflicts of interest  
20 and are willing to prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class).

## 21                   **2. The Class Meets The Requirements Of Rule 23(b)(3)**

22       "In addition to meeting the conditions imposed by Rule 23(a), the parties seeking class  
23 certification must also show that the action is maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2) or  
24 (3)." *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the proposed class is  
25 maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3), as common questions predominate over any questions affecting  
26 only individual members and class resolution is superior to other available methods for a fair  
27 resolution of the controversy. *Id.* Plaintiffs' liability case depends, first and foremost, on whether  
28 Anthem used reasonable data security to protect their PII. *See* Class Cert. at 11-13; Class Cert.

1 Reply at 9-11. That question can be resolved using the same evidence for all class members, and  
2 thus is the precise type of predominant question that makes a class-wide adjudication worthwhile.  
3 *See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (“When ‘one or more of the  
4 central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may  
5 be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) ...’”).

6 Certification is particularly appropriate in this context because manageability  
7 considerations do not need to be taken into account: “the proposal is that there be no trial,” and so  
8 manageability considerations have no impact on whether the proposed settlement class should be  
9 certified. *Amchem Prods. v. Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). There is only the predominant  
10 issue of whether Anthem properly secured the personal information taken from its data warehouse,  
11 such that Anthem’s security should be improved and class members affected by the data breach  
12 provided with a remedy. As a practical matter, that issue cannot be resolved through individual  
13 trials or settlement negotiations: the amount at stake for individual class members is too small, the  
14 technical issues involved are too complex, and the required expert testimony and document review  
15 too costly. *See Just Film*, 847 F.3d 1108 at 1123. A class action is thus the superior method of  
16 adjudicating consumer claims arising from this data breach – just as in other data breach cases  
17 where a class-wide settlement has been approved. *See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig.*,  
18 309 F.R.D. 573, 585 (N.D. Cal. 2015); *In re the Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach*  
19 *Litig.*, 2016 WL 6902351, at \*2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016); *In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer*  
20 *Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 2009 WL 5184352, at \*6–7 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009).

21 **B. The Settlement Merits Final Approval**

22 A proposed class action settlement may be approved if the Court, after allowing absent  
23 class members an opportunity to be heard, finds that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and  
24 adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). When assessing a proposed settlement, “the court’s intrusion  
25 upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit  
26 must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the  
27 product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and the  
28

1 settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Rodriguez v. West*  
2 *Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).

3 To assess whether a settlement merits final approval, courts in this Circuit typically  
4 consider the following factors:

- 5 (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case;
- 6 (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation;
- 7 (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial;
- 8 (4) the amount offered in settlement;
- 9 (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings;
- 10 (6) the experience and views of counsel;
- 11 (7) the presence of a governmental participant;
- 12 (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement; and
- 13 (9) whether the settlement is a product of collusion among the parties.

14 *Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575-76 (9th Cir. 2004); *In re Bluetooth Headset*  
15 *Products Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). As discussed in the sections that follow,  
16 an analysis of these factors shows this settlement to be advantageous to the class and worthy of  
17 judicial approval.

### 18 **1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case**

19 Plaintiffs believe they have built a strong case for liability. As detailed in their class  
20 certification papers and discussed briefly above, the evidence suggests Anthem failed to take a  
21 number of industry-standard measures to secure the private information stored in its data  
22 warehouse; that Anthem ignored warnings and underfunded its data security; and that Anthem  
23 missed numerous opportunities to detect and stop hacker activity while the data breach was  
24 underway. *See* Class Cert at 2-4. The liability case is not ironclad, however. Anthem argued that  
25 it had assembled a robust IT security program that had a track record of warding off attempted  
26 attacks and had been lauded by independent cybersecurity organizations. *See* Class Cert. Opp. at  
27 3-5. It characterized the data breach as an unstoppable state-sponsored attack that used never-  
28 before-seen technology, and pointed out that Anthem’s quick response to the attack had earned  
praise from federal officials and industry experts. *Id.* Plaintiffs believe they have answers to those

1 contentions (*see* Class Cert Reply at 4-5), and a reasonably good chance of proving that Anthem's  
2 data security was inadequate. Plaintiffs further believe that if they establish that central factual  
3 issue, Anthem is likely to be found liable under at least some of the liability theories and state laws  
4 Plaintiffs had pled in their complaint.

5 Plaintiffs believe their damages theories also stand a good chance of succeeding in some  
6 form, as they had withstood vigorous legal challenges at the motion-to-dismiss stage and Plaintiffs  
7 had supported the theories with reports from highly qualified expert witnesses. The range of  
8 potential outcomes is large, however. Anthem had challenged both the Benefit of the Bargain  
9 theory and the Loss of Value of PII theory through *Daubert* motions, and also raised additional  
10 legal and factual arguments regarding Plaintiffs' damages theories. Further, while Plaintiffs'  
11 theories were sound in principle, their application to data breach litigation was untested beyond the  
12 pleading stage. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 18. The scope of damages depended in large part on the scope  
13 of class certification, which had yet to be decided. *Id.* The Benefit of the Bargain theory depended  
14 upon the results of a conjoint study that could not be completed until after class certification, and  
15 there was no guarantee that Plaintiffs would ultimately have found this type of damage at all. *Id.*  
16 And it is possible that both the Benefit of the Bargain theory and the Loss of Value of PII theory  
17 could yield large numbers that would be unpalatable to a jury. *Id.* If applied across all potential  
18 class members, Plaintiffs' most conservative measure (based on black-market rates of at least \$4  
19 per individual) would yield a figure of \$316 million or more, while the most expansive measure  
20 (based on at least \$9 of monthly credit monitoring costs) would yield much higher numbers.

21 While the legal theory behind the larger numbers may be sound, it is untested, and, as a practical  
22 matter, Plaintiffs' counsel recognize that taking such large numbers to a jury presents substantial  
23 strategic risks. *Id.* Even a number in the mid-hundreds of millions potentially risks offending a  
24 jury, and leading to a nominal award – or no monetary award at all.

25 The Out-of-Pocket Consequential Damages theory, which is more tangible, applies to only  
26 a relatively small subset of the class, and would have required class members to come forward  
27 individually and document their losses with respect to a breach that happened years before trial.  
28 *See* Class Cert. at 22-23; Order on 2nd MTD at 22-29. Anthem also had presented evidence

1 raising doubts about Plaintiffs' ability to pinpoint the source of any identity fraud, having  
2 forensically examined Plaintiffs' computers to test for the possibility that malicious software  
3 compromised their personal information, catalogued other data breaches that involved Plaintiffs'  
4 data, and retained an expert to attempt to demonstrate that Plaintiffs' private information being  
5 offered for sale on the Dark Web was unrelated to the Anthem data breach. Class Cert. Opp. at 21-  
6 23.

7           **2. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further**  
8           **Litigation**

9           Overall, it is fair to characterize this litigation as a strong data breach case, but a very  
10 complex one that still faces numerous hurdles, a well-funded and committed defense, and a wide  
11 range of possible outcomes. The case involves millions of people, hundreds of legal claims that  
12 implicate several different legal doctrines and the laws of all fifty states, highly technical subject  
13 matter, ten expert witnesses, and a pending class certification motion and related *Daubert* motions.  
14 Plaintiffs have spent close to \$2 million on the litigation to date, and those expenses would only  
15 continue to mount if the litigation were to continue. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 56.

16           Almost all class actions involve a high level of risk, expense, and complexity, which is one  
17 reason that judicial policy so strongly favors resolving class actions through settlement. *Linney v.*  
18 *Cellular Alaska P'ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998). But this is an especially complex  
19 class proceeding in an especially risky field of litigation. Historically, data breach cases faced  
20 substantial hurdles in making it past the pleading stage. *See Hammond v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon*  
21 *Corp.*, 2010 WL 2643307, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (collecting cases and noting that "every  
22 court to [analyze data breach cases] has ultimately dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ... or under Rule  
23 56 following the submission of a motion for summary judgment); *In re Countrywide Fin. Corp.*  
24 *Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 2010 WL 3341200, at \*6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010) (approving  
25 data breach settlement, in part, because "proceeding through the litigation process in this case is  
26 unlikely to produce the plaintiffs' desired results"). The law has gradually adapted to this  
27 relatively new type of litigation, and through cases like this one, precedent has been mounting for  
28 holding corporations responsible when they collect private data without adequately securing it.  
But the path to a class-wide monetary judgment remains untrodden, and it will take some time

1 before litigants and courts navigate all the unique issues posed by data breach lawsuits and some  
2 level of certainty sets in – particularly in the area of damages. For now, data breach cases are  
3 among the most risky and uncertain of all class action litigation, making settlement the more  
4 prudent course when a reasonable deal is on the table.

5 By settling now, class members can obtain timely and practical remedies that otherwise  
6 would not be available for years, if at all. What typical class members want most is not their share  
7 of a hypothetical billion-dollar judgment (which would amount to about \$13 per class member),  
8 but for their private information to remain confidential and secure. Extended credit monitoring  
9 services and immediate changes to Anthem’s data-security practices can help achieve that goal.  
10 Credit monitoring works to prevent and detect misuse of information taken in the data breach,  
11 while changes in data-security practices work to reduce the risk of future breaches. Plaintiffs had  
12 requested both as equitable relief, but by the time that Plaintiffs obtained a judgment and Anthem  
13 had exhausted its appeals, neither would be of as much value to class members. Credit monitoring  
14 services are needed most in the first four to five years after a data breach occurs, and security  
15 measures are most effective the sooner they can be implemented. *See* Class Cert. at 13; Cervantez  
16 Decl. ¶ 14. This is a case, in other words, where delay hurts class members, making prompt  
17 settlement all the more important. Absent a settlement, there is nothing class members can  
18 individually do to make the personal information stored in Anthem’s data warehouse more secure,  
19 and the only way that they could obtain credit monitoring is to purchase it themselves – at the high  
20 retail cost of \$9-\$20 per month (which they may not be able to afford). Cervantez Decl. ¶ 15.

### 21 **3. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial**

22 None of the hundreds of claims involved in this litigation have been certified yet. Plaintiffs  
23 have filed a motion to certify four bellwether claims, and Anthem has opposed, with the two sides  
24 submitting hundreds of exhibits and reports from ten expert witnesses. *See* Plaintiffs’ Revised  
25 Index of Evidence [ECF 752]; Defendants’ Index of Evidence [ECF 805-1]. While Plaintiffs  
26 believe they have made a strong showing on the four bellwether claims, as with other aspects of  
27 data breach litigation, there is little directly analogous precedent to rely upon. Class certification  
28 has been denied in other consumer data breach cases. *See* Class Cert. Opp. at 21. Indeed, it was

1 only earlier this year that the first litigation class was certified in a consumer data breach case. *See*  
2 *Smith v. Triad of Alabama, LLC*, 2017 WL 1044692, at \*16 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017). Plaintiffs  
3 expect that there should and will be more data breach certifications to come, and see no reason  
4 why Plaintiffs' claims should be treated differently than the contract and consumer protection  
5 claims that are regularly certified in non-data breach cases. But the dearth of direct precedent adds  
6 to the risks posed by continued litigation.

#### 7 **4. The Amount Offered In Settlement**

8 In light of the risks and uncertainties presented by data breach litigation, the \$115 million  
9 settlement fund achieved for the class in this case is truly groundbreaking. An insurance company  
10 that specializes in data breaches, and publishes a regular newsletter on data breach legal issues and  
11 trends, wrote last year: “[D]efendants are unlikely to pay *anywhere close* to \$1 per class member to  
12 settle an action brought by a class on behalf of 100 million potentially affected individuals.”  
13 Marcello Antonucci et al., *Post-Spokeo, Data Breach Defendants Can’t Get Spooked – They*  
14 *Should Stand Up To The Class Action Plaintiff Bogeyman*, Beazley Breach Insights, Oct. 27, 2016,  
15 <https://www.beazley.com/documents/Insights/201610-data-breach-class-action-settlements.pdf>  
16 (emphasis added). While reducing the settlement achieved here to what the Company will pay  
17 out-of-pocket per class member ignores the comprehensive, and costly, business practice changes  
18 to improve its data security and the true value of the settlement to the Class, here, Defendants have  
19 agreed to pay \$1.46 per class member – by far the highest figure any defendant has ever paid as the  
20 result of a large data breach affecting millions of consumers. By way of example:

- 21 • The Home Depot data breach, which involved the theft of approximately 40 million  
22 consumers’ payment data and 53 million consumers’ email addresses, resolved with  
23 Home Depot creating a \$13 million fund for consumers, paying an additional \$6.5  
24 million for internet and dark web monitoring services (which was eligible to be repaid  
25 from the fund), paying the costs of notice and settlement administration (which also  
26 were eligible to be repaid from the fund), and paying \$7.5 million in attorney fees. *See*  
27 *In re the Home Depot, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, No. 1:14-MD-02583-  
28

1 TWT, ECF 181-2 (March 7, 2016) (Settlement Agreement); *id.*, 2016 WL 6902351, at  
2 \*6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016) (order approving settlement).

- 3 • The Target data breach, which compromised the personal information of nearly 100  
4 million consumers, resolved with Target establishing a settlement fund of \$10 million,  
5 paying the costs of notice and settlement administration, and paying \$6.75 million in  
6 attorney fees. *See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, No. 14-MD-  
7 2522-PAM, ECF 358-1 (March 18, 2015) (Settlement Agreement); *id.*, 2017 WL  
8 2178306, at \*2 (D. Minn. May 17, 2017) (order approving settlement on remand from  
9 the 8th Circuit).
- 10 • The Ashley Madison data breach, which exposed the personal information of 36 million  
11 customers and has been linked to divorce proceedings, blackmail attempts, and at least  
12 two suicides, recently resolved with Ashley Madison agreeing to establish a settlement  
13 fund of \$11.2 million. *See In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Security Breach*  
14 *Litigation*, No. 4:15-MD-02669-JAR, ECF 354, at \*5-6 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2017)  
15 (preliminary approval order).

16 These comparisons are not intended to disparage the settlements achieved in those cases,  
17 but to underscore that Plaintiffs have capitalized on the strength of their case and achieved good  
18 value for the class. The benefits offered to class members are particularly timely as well, coming  
19 soon after the two years of credit monitoring initially offered by Anthem has expired. Class  
20 members will receive a minimum of two additional years of credit monitoring, with a possibility  
21 that the credit monitoring will be extended for an additional two years if funds remain in the  
22 Settlement Fund after other distributions, such that the Settlement may meet or exceed the five  
23 years of credit monitoring recommended by Plaintiffs' expert. *See SA* ¶ 7.1. And for those class  
24 members who have already purchased credit monitoring for themselves, or otherwise incurred  
25 expenses as a result of the data breach, they will now be able to recover those expenses – and they  
26 will be able to do so using a relaxed causation standard. *See id.* ¶¶ 1.23, 6.3. The proposed  
27 settlement will also allow all class members – even those who fail to enroll in the monitoring  
28



1 services – to seek assistance with fraud resolution if they should fall victim to identity theft during  
2 the period while credit monitoring services are in effect. *Id.* ¶ 4.9.

3 While the size of the Settlement Fund is indeed groundbreaking, \$115 million understates  
4 the value of the Settlement to class members. Because the Settlement Fund will be used to  
5 purchase credit monitoring in bulk, the Settlement generates economies of scale that would not  
6 otherwise be available to individual class members. If this case did not settle and class members  
7 wanted to purchase comparable credit monitoring services from Experian themselves, they would  
8 need to spend between \$9.99 and \$19.99 per month. Cervantez Decl. ¶¶ 9, 15. The credit  
9 monitoring alone can thus be valued at more than \$240 per class member – or even more than \$480  
10 per class member if sufficient funds remain to extend the credit monitoring for an additional 24  
11 months. When multiplied by the 891,431 class members who have filed claims for credit  
12 monitoring so far, that yields a value of between \$213 and \$427 million. And when multiplied by  
13 all 80 million members of the class, the retail value of credit monitoring services made available to  
14 the class reaches into the billions. *See Johansson-Dohrmann v. Cbr. Sys., Inc.*, 2013 WL 3864341,  
15 \*5, 9 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) (valuing settlement using retail value of credit monitoring services  
16 made available to the class).

17 The settlement also has added value to class members going forward, in that it will reduce  
18 the risk that the private information class members have entrusted to Anthem – and continue to  
19 entrust to Anthem – is compromised by future attacks. Settlement Ex. 2 [ECF 869-11]. While  
20 Plaintiffs have not attempted to put a monetary value on the significant business practice  
21 commitments that Anthem has made under the Settlement, at a minimum, Anthem will be required  
22 to spend ██████████ over the next three years to help protect class members' personal  
23 information – ██████████ more than it would have spent if Anthem's data-security budget  
24 remained at pre-breach levels. *Id.* ¶ 8. When combined with the \$115 million settlement fund, the  
25 two years of credit monitoring that Anthem purchased for class members during the litigation, and  
26 the outlays Anthem has already made to upgrade its security during the litigation, Plaintiffs are  
27 confident that this litigation has created strong incentives not only for Anthem, but for the many  
28

1 other companies who collect vast amounts of the public’s private information, to invest in  
2 appropriate levels of data security.

3 **5. The Extent of Discovery Completed and The Stage of Proceedings**

4 Before entering into settlement discussions on behalf of class members, counsel should  
5 have “sufficient information to make an informed decision.” *Linney*, 151 F.3d at 1239. In the two  
6 years after Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the consolidated class complaint, they have litigated two  
7 motions to dismiss, 14 discovery motions before this Court and one in Washington, D.C. to compel  
8 production of federal government documents; reviewed 3.8 million pages of documents; deposed  
9 18 percipient fact witnesses, 62 corporate designees, and six defense experts; produced reports  
10 from four experts and defended their depositions; produced over 100 plaintiffs for depositions and  
11 produced 29 of those plaintiffs’ computers for forensic examinations; and fully briefed class  
12 certification and related *Daubert* motions. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 3. They know the strengths and  
13 weaknesses of the class’s claims, have worked extensively with experts to value those claims and  
14 to understand the business practice changes necessary to protect class members’ data in the future,  
15 and are well-equipped to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the class. *Id.* ¶ 19.

16 **6. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

17 The Court appointed experienced and qualified counsel with substantial experience  
18 litigating complex class actions of all kinds, including data breach cases, to serve as Plaintiffs’  
19 Lead Counsel and Steering Committee. *See* 9/11/15 Order [ECF 284]; ECF 751-14 to 761-17.  
20 Those attorneys have represented Plaintiffs and putative class members in that role for more than  
21 two years, devoting tens of thousands of hours to the case, and have no reservations in  
22 recommending the Settlement as a very good deal for the class. Cervantez Decl. ¶ 20; Friedman  
23 Decl. ¶ 2, Sobol Decl. ¶ 23, Gibbs Decl. ¶ 2.

24 **7. The Presence of a Government Participant**

25 No governmental agency is involved in this litigation, but the Attorney General of the  
26 United States and Attorneys General of each of the States have been notified of the proposed  
27 settlement pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, and given an opportunity  
28

1 to raise any objections or concerns they might have. *See* Geraci Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. To date, none of  
2 these government officials have come forward with any complaints about the Settlement. *Id.* ¶ 5.

3 It is also worth noting that eight state insurance commissioners entered into a separate  
4 settlement with Anthem in December 2016. That settlement is far less expansive than the  
5 proposed settlement now before the Court. It only provided additional credit protection for  
6 affected minors (at an estimated cost of \$15 million), and required that Anthem finish  
7 implementing security measures that it was already in the process of installing (at an estimated cost  
8 of \$30 million). Cervantez Decl. Ex. 14, Sec. D. Although the insurance commissioners are  
9 empowered to assess administrative fines and penalties, they specifically found that no additional  
10 relief was warranted and that Anthem's pre-breach cybersecurity was reasonable. *Id.*, Sec. A.5(a),  
11 A.7.

#### 12 **8. The Reaction of Class Members to the Settlement**

13 Class Members have until December 29, 2017 to comment on the Settlement, so it is not  
14 yet possible to fully assess this factor. 8/25/17 Order ¶¶ 14-16. Early returns are promising,  
15 however. The Settlement is receiving a high level of interest from class members, with 855,767  
16 people visiting the Settlement Website to date and 82,020 people calling the Settlement  
17 Administrator's automated phone line for more information. Geraci Decl. ¶¶ 19-20. The  
18 Settlement has also received a fair amount of national media attention, with NBC News, USA  
19 Today, and CNET, among others, reporting on the remedies available to class members. *See, e.g.*,  
20 [https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/anthem-pay-record-115m-settle-lawsuits-over-data-](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/anthem-pay-record-115m-settle-lawsuits-over-data-breach-n776246)  
21 [breach-n776246; https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/06/26/anthem-settles-](https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/06/26/anthem-settles-security-breach-lawsuit-affecting-80m/103217152)  
22 [security-breach-lawsuit-affecting-80m/103217152; https://www.cnet.com/news/anthem-would-](https://www.cnet.com/news/anthem-would-pay-record-115m-to-settle-data-breach-suit)  
23 [pay-record-115m-to-settle-data-breach-suit.](https://www.cnet.com/news/anthem-would-pay-record-115m-to-settle-data-breach-suit)

24 Class members will have until January 29, 2018 to file claims for credit monitoring or  
25 alternative compensation and another year to claim out of pocket damages. But already, 891,431  
26 class members have filed claims for credit monitoring, 106,417 class members have filed claims  
27 for alternate compensation, and 11,680 class members have filed claims for out-of-pocket costs.  
28 Geraci Decl. ¶¶ 21-22. In contrast, only eight class members have objected to or commented on

1 the settlement and only 169 have submitted opt-out requests. ECF Nos. 906-908, 911-913; Geraci  
2 Decl. ¶¶ 23-24. To avoid duplicative briefing and conserve judicial resources, Plaintiffs will wait  
3 until the objection deadline has passed, and address all objections lodged by the class together in  
4 their reply brief. At this point, however, it is fair to say that the class’s level of participation  
5 reflects well on the settlement and indicates that it is providing needed relief.

6 **9. Lack of Collusion Among the Parties**

7 When a proposed settlement is negotiated prior to class certification, the Ninth Circuit has  
8 emphasized that “consideration of th[e] eight *Churchill* factors alone is not enough to survive  
9 appellate review,” and that the district court should also scrutinize the settlement for subtle signs of  
10 collusion or conflicts of interest. *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 946. Signs that the Ninth Circuit has  
11 said may indicate that plaintiffs’ counsel may have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests to  
12 infect negotiations include:

- 13 (1) when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when the  
14 class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded
- 15 (2) when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing” arrangement providing for the payment of  
16 attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class funds
- 17 (3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be  
18 added to the class fund

18 *Id.* at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted). None of those warning signs are present here. Class  
19 Counsel will not receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement. As explained in  
20 Plaintiffs’ fee application, Class Counsel is requesting attorneys’ fees that fall well within the  
21 range of permissible percentage-based awards and reflect a negligible multiplier, if any. The  
22 parties also did not negotiate a clear sailing arrangement that provides for the payment of fees  
23 separate from class funds. Class Counsel’s fees will be paid from the same non-reversionary  
24 Settlement Fund as class members, and so Class Counsel had every reason to negotiate the largest  
25 fund possible. And rather than revert to Defendants, any fees that are not awarded to Class  
26 Counsel will remain in the Settlement Fund. Finally, it bears mentioning that the settlement was  
27 negotiated over the course of several full-day mediation sessions with Judge Layn R. Phillips  
28 (Ret.), and the final terms stemmed from Judge Phillips’ mediator’s proposal. *See G. F. v. Contra*

1 *Costa Cty.*, 2015 WL 4606078, at \*13 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2015) (“[T]he assistance of an  
2 experienced mediator in the settlement process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.”)  
3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the parties’  
6 settlement and enter judgment consistent with its terms.

7  
8 Respectfully Submitted,

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